The Khalkhin Gol Conflict and Japan’s Foreign Policy in 1939 – early 1941 (Review of Japanese Historiography)

Abstract

The authors look into the history and events of the Khalkhin Gol war through the prism of political and economic processes in East Asia, using rare historical sources that usually fall under the radar of most researchers. The Japanese troops in the Khalkha River area stopped hostilities due to the position of the country’s top politicians. The authors show that decisions of the Japanese government were determined by China's unyielding resistance against the aggression and the difficult economic situation in Japan, which had lost access to a number of foreign markets after 1 September 1939, causing its interest in the Soviet Trans-Siberian Railway as an alternative route for trade with Europe including Germany. Moreover, the authors point out that one of the key factors that prompted Japanese leadership to agree to peace negotiations with Moscow and stop escalating the military aggression against the USSR was the effectiveness of the Red Army’s actions in Khalkhin Gol. At the same time, Japan’s military expenses significantly increased as a result of the Nomongan conflict. However, as the article proves by concrete examples, the Japanese militarists did not fully abandon their plans of a war against USSR. At the same time, the authors demonstrate that by 1941 Japanese military leaders had reached a dead end in their strategic planning against Soviet Union. Their projects turned out to be inefficient for tasks and goals that had emerged as a result of the Red Army’s victory at Khalkhin Gol.