The key to India?: Britain and the Herat problem 1830–1863 — part 1

Abstract

The Anglo-Persian treaty of March 4, 1857,2 which ended 'John Company's last war' had a great deal to say about Herat. The key articles are 5, 6 and 7. By article 5, Persia engaged to withdraw 'from the territory and city of Herat, and from every other part of Afghanistan' all 'troops and authorities now stationed therein' within three months of the date of ratifications (that is by the beginning of August 1857). Article 6 bound Persia 'to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the countries of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience' and to recognise their independence and never to interfere with it. In return, the British government agreed 'to exert their influence with the States of Afghanistan, to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them, or by any of them' to Persia and to help to compose any differences. Article 7 safeguarded to Persia the right to take military action, if necessary across her eastern frontier, if that frontier was violated by the Afghans but obliged her to retire her troops as soon as possible and not use such action 'as a pretext for the permanent occupation . .. or for the annexation to the Persian dominions, of any town or portion of the said States'. So far as they reflect a developing British official attitude to Herat, these articles have a double aspect: one concerns the Herat-Persia relationship and the other Herat's relations with the Afghans to the east. The 1857 treaty marks a very small advance on Sheil's agreement of 18533 so far as Herat and Persia are concerned. The wording was greatly tightened up and much of the ambiguity removed so as to make it as clear as words could that Herat was totally independent of Persia. The 1853 reference to Persia's rights at Herat was omitted. But the spirit and intention of Sheil's agreement in this respect was not significantly changed by the events of the intervening four years. The big advance on Sheil's engagement, although more implicit than stated is in the matter of Herat's relationship with Kabul and Kandahar. The 1853 document treated each of them as a 'foreign state' just like any other which Britain promised to restrain from interfering with Herat's 'own state of independence'. The consequent need to restrain Dost Muhammad's ambitions in the Herat direction seriously inhibited Dalhousie in his attempts to enter into a treaty relationship with that ruler in 1854-5. Now Herat, although frequently distinguished from the rest, is regarded as one of the Afghan states and Britain simply promises to use her influence with all or any of them to prevent 'any cause of umbrage' being given to Persia. In 1853 the ambiguity favoured Persia. In 1857 it favoured Britain. In 1853 the exclusion of Persia from Herat was, and had been for years, a cardinal aim of British foreign policy and the agreed means to that end was the maintenance of Herat as an independent state. Now in 1857 while the end remained unchanged, the possibility of a