Abstract

The Sadrist Movement (“at-Tayyār as-Sadri”) broke into Iraqi politics in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government as a result of the US invasion in 2003. The previously clandestine movement emerged from the shadows and proved to be a powerful force that dramatically adjusted Washington's plans for Iraq. Muqtada as-Sadr who positions himself as an anticorruption fighter and champion of equality and social justice, united under his umbrella people of sundry political views: from graduates of Shia religious schools to secular-minded left-wingers. As-Sadr’s personality, shaded by the haloed figure of his father-martyr, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq as-Sadr, plays an essential role in consolidating such a vast variety of beliefs. Meanwhile, the absence of strict hierarchy and organizational structure inside the movement prevents Muqtada as-Sadr from effectively managing the “sadrist current”, which at the same time is strongly influenced by his own instable and unpredictable character. An old ally of Iran with the history of effective cooperation dating back to the times of anti-American resistance, as-Sadr maintains substantial independence from Tehran, despite his uttered support for the “Wilāyat al-Faqīh” theory understood in large part identically with the ideological doctrine of the Islamic Republic, as it seems from as-Sadr’s declarations. This makes him a hard but indispensable partner of Iranians in Iraq. In general, as-Sadr prefers to avoid taking serious political responsibilities, feeling comfortable in a specific métier of gadfly and dissenter. However, he provided vital support for the government in crucial moments, as his supporters actively participated in the operations of popular mobilization forces against ISIS, as well as in actions aimed to moderate and curb the mass protests in 2019–2020. As-Sadr also repeatedly advocated the idea of the popular mobilization forces integration into the structures of the federal army, thus contributing to the latent government-led campaign of re-establishing the state’s monopoly on armed operations.

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