Abstract

Abstract As a rule, the Kantian capacity for self-control is interpreted as a kind of tool for compelling ourselves to act on the basis of the maxims we have adopted. To the extent that we merely acknowledge its role in following already-adopted maxims, however, we fail to capture the distinctive aspect of moral self-control identified by Kant. In this paper, I propose a fuller account of the Kantian capacity for moral self-control; I do so mainly by analyzing this capacity as our ability to “abstract from” various sensible impressions. This analysis shows that Kant’s conception of moral self-control involves two intimately related levels, which are subject to different criteria. Whereas the first level is connected to our ability to adopt moral maxims and requires that we abstract from all sensible impressions, the second is associated with our ability to follow these maxims and does not necessarily require this radical abstraction.

Highlights

  • The context in which Kant mentions the term “Selbstbeherrschung” at the beginning of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can lead to the conclusion that the capacity for self-control is not supposed to play a key role in his account of virtue.[1]

  • Kant insists that virtue involves adopting moral maxims and argues that it surpasses the fulfilment of the duty of apathy (MM 6: 408): Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his control and so to rule over himself [Herrschaft über sich selbst], which goes beyond forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations; for unless reason holds the reins of government [die Zügel der Regierung] in its own hands, his feelings and inclinations play the master over him

  • As the constitutive basis of virtue, inner freedom is, or at least presupposes, the capacity for moral self-control, which is necessarily involved in the process of adopting maxims of virtue

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Summary

Introduction

The context in which Kant mentions the term “Selbstbeherrschung” (self-control) at the beginning of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can lead to the conclusion that the capacity for self-control is not supposed to play a key role in his account of virtue.[1]. It may seem that Kant does not praise self-control

References are to
Self-Control as Autocracy
Allison’s Reading of the Autonomy-Autocracy Distinction
Self-Control as Abstraction
V oluntary Distraction
22 See C 7
Abstraction in the Narrow Sense and its Multiple Functions
Self-control as Preventing Affects
25 See for example A 7
Self-Control as Preventing Passions
Self-control as Disregarding All Inclinations and Corresponding Feelings
40 See for example C2 5: 93 and MM 6
Conclusion
46 See also C2 5

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