Abstract
This article examines the Kansas Supreme Court case of K.M.H. , 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007) within the context of an increasing body of US case law that addresses the legal status of known sperm donors vis-a-vis their biological children born to women who are not in heterosexual marriages. The article begins with an explanation of US parentage law and then reviews and synthesizes the cases leading up to the K.M.H. decision. The article then details the four different opinions in the K.M.H. case, and, in particular, lays out the discussion of the constitutional challenges to the Kansas sperm donor statute. Next the article discusses how the previous known sperm donor cases impacted the sperm donor’s arguments in K.M.H. , and how these cases failed to support his claim for parental rights. The article continues with a review of two more decisions, issued after the K.M.H. case, incorporating these cases into the evolving trends discerned in the recent court decisions. The article concludes by summarizing K.M.H. ’s position within that evolution.
Highlights
On October 27, 2007, the Kansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of In the Interest of K.M.H and K.C.H1, joining the growing number of states that have determined the legal status of known sperm donors vis-à-vis their biological children born to women who are not in heterosexual marriages
Deborah alleged Steven was not entitled to parental rights, relying on the California sperm donor statute, which stated the ‘donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.’[54]. The trial court found that this statute, ‘did not preclude a finding of paternity because of the doctrine of estoppel prevents [Deborah] from denying [Steven] his rights as a biological father. [Deborah’s] conduct clearly reflects that [she] intended [Steven] to be Trevor’s father and to be a part of Trevor’s life
There D.H. asserted for the first time he relied on S.H. being an attorney, that she knew the law required him to have a written agreement to be considered the birth father and she entered into an oral agreement instead, because she ‘knew that she could obtain the sperm and be safe from [D.H.] if he asserted claims.’[123]. Even more specific was the affidavit D.H. unsuccessfully attempted to submit with his Motion for Re-Hearing, after the Kansas Supreme Court ruled against him
Summary
On October 27, 2007, the Kansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of In the Interest of K.M.H and K.C.H1 (hereinafter K.M.H.), joining the growing number of states that have determined the legal status of known sperm donors vis-à-vis their biological children born to women who are not in heterosexual marriages. The article examines the US court decisions involving known sperm donors asserting parental rights prior to the K.M.H. decision. In the common law system the court decisions are the law and the inferior courts must follow the appellate court decisions In those situations in which there are no applicable assisted insemination by donor (AID) statutes, the court decisions become the sole law on the subject of whether known sperm donors have parental rights. Even when the legislature has enacted AID statutes that address the parental rights of sperm donors, the courts have the authority to interpret those statutes and these interpretations become binding law until the legislature amends the statute. The article discusses how the previous known sperm donor cases impacted the sperm donor’s arguments in K.M.H., and how these cases failed to support his claim for parental rights. The article concludes by summarizing K.M.H.’s position within that evolution
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