Abstract
This chapter concerns the justification of property rights, and makes the argument that we do have ‘natural’ or ‘pre-legal’ rights to the use of things, a kind of usufructory right. The Kantian theory of property rights, most thoroughly and convincingly developed by Arthur Ripstein is discussed in detail. Various aspects of the theory are criticized, in particular Kant’s view of right to appropriate unowned things and his famous ‘assurance’ argument. In explaining his differences with the Kantian theory, the author expounds what has been called an ‘instrumentalist’ view of law in general and property law in particular, a view most closely associated with the private law writings of John Gardner.
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