The justification of morality

Abstract

The most basic problem of moral philosophy concerns the rational justification of morality. While the justification may have various interpretations, in an especially stringent sense it involves proving that any agent contradicts himself if he rejects the moral requirement that he must act with favorable consideration for the important interests of other persons even when this goes against his self-interest. An apodictic justification of this sort serves to explain, among other things, how and why the precepts of morality are categorically obligatory, in that compliance with them is rationally mandatory for all actual or prospective agents regardless of their personal desires or institutional affiliations. In Reason and Morality' I have tried to provide such a justification of morality by giving a detailed argument for a certain substantial moral principle, the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). Addressed to every actual or prospective agent, the PGC says: "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself." The generic rights are rights to have one's behavior characterized by the generic features of action and successful action in general: freedom (consisting in control of one's behavior by one's unforced choice while having knowledge of relevant circumstances) and well-being (consisting in having the general abilities and conditions needed for achieving one's purposes). According to the PGC, then, it is incumbent on every actual or prospective agent to actwith favorable consideration for the freedom and well-being of other persons as well as of himself or herself; and such action is a matter of the rights of the persons concerned. My general line of argument has undertaken to prove that any agent who rejects the PGC contradicts himself, so that in this way the PGC, as the supreme principle of morality, is given the rational justification referred to above. Such an ambitious project has naturally received much critical