Abstract

The Judicial Trilemma, by Jeff Dunoff and Mark Pollack, studies the dynamic relations between accountability, transparency, and independence, and suggests that designers can only maximize two of these three values at once. They can create a court that has high levels of (1) independence and accountability, (2) transparency and independence, or (3) accountability and transparency, but only at the cost of having a low level of the third value. The article explores these ideas using four different international tribunals, but its insights are not limited to international courts. Domestic designers also have to decide what levels of accountability, independence, and transparency their courts should have, and in making a decision they will face the Judicial Trilemma and confront the hard choice of selecting primarily two out of three values.

Highlights

  • The Judicial Trilemma, by Jeff Dunoff and Mark Pollack, studies the dynamic relations between accountability, transparency, and independence, and suggests that designers can only maximize two of these three values at once.[1]. They can create a court that has high levels of (1) independence and accountability, (2) transparency and independence, or (3) accountability and transparency, but only at the cost of having a low level of the third value. The article explores these ideas using four different international tribunals, but its insights are not limited to international courts

  • Domestic designers have to decide what levels of accountability, independence, and transparency their courts should have, and in making a decision they will face the Judicial Trilemma and confront the hard choice of selecting primarily two out of three values

  • Between 1998 and 2005 Ecuador had one of the most dependent judiciaries in the region and three different Supreme Courts were appointed or dissolved.[3]. What explains this difference between the constitutional norm and political reality? Life tenure had the perverse effect of undermining judicial independence rather than enhancing it

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Summary

Mauricio Guim*

The Judicial Trilemma, by Jeff Dunoff and Mark Pollack, studies the dynamic relations between accountability, transparency, and independence, and suggests that designers can only maximize two of these three values at once.[1] They can create a court that has high levels of (1) independence and accountability, (2) transparency and independence, or (3) accountability and transparency, but only at the cost of having a low level of the third value. The article explores these ideas using four different international tribunals, but its insights are not limited to international courts. These courts expose the limits of the theory and how under different circumstances the Trilemma’s responses can become perversely self-defeating

High Levels of Independence and Transparency Can Increase Accountability
High Levels of Accountability and Independence Can Increase Transparency
AJIL UNBOUND
Dissenting Opinions and Judicial Transparency
High Levels of Accountability and Transparency Can Increase Independence
Conclusions
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