The Joy of Difference

Abstract

In 1970, Michael Foucault was elected chair in the History of Systems of Thought at the College de France, one of the most prestigious academic institutions in France. His responsibilities as member primarily consisted of research and limited amount of lecturing. However, his position also included other duties, notably the election of new thinkers replace those who had retired or were otherwise unable continue. It was as part of these duties that Foucault encouraged Pierre Hadot, who occupied chair in Latin Patristics at the Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, accept candidacy for election chair in the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought at the College de France in 1983. Foucault and Hadot met for the first time in person during the discussions of Hadot's candidacy for chair although they were already both quite familiar with each other's work (Flynn 2005, 614). Foucault in particular had been an admirer of Hadot's work on Hellenistic and Roman philosophy for some time and had used it in his work on antiquity: I believe it was in 1982 that Michel Foucault first mentioned Pierre Hadot me. Struck by Foucault's enthusiasm, I photocopied number of Hadot's articles, but, my regret, never got around reading them until several years after Foucault's death. I immediately understood, and shared, Foucault's excitement. (Davidson 1995, 1) Foucault was struck by Hadot's characterization of ancient philosophy as of life - spiritual practice of self-transformation that was more than just an assemblage of truths, it was practice of continual improvement of oneself and one's world (Foucault 1990a, 8). The two philosophers both shared the goal with the ancients that philosophy might occasion personal and social transformation. In this regard, Foucault's description of his role as an intellectual - This work of modifying one's thought and that of others seems me be the intellectual's reason for - parallels Hadot's description of philosophy as a conversion, transformation of one's of being and living, even as they both echo the ancients' practice of philosophy (Foucault 1996b, 461; Hadot 1995a, 275). Interestingly, their conception of philosophy as transformative practice acts reflexively back on the ancients from whom they got such notion of philosophy. These two thinkers approach ancient philosophy as part of practice of philosophy as of Ufe and, resultantly, Hadot and Foucault put ancient philosophy use as part of their projects of contemporary transformation. In the history of philosophy both thinkers find body of wisdom that can be cultivated and reworked serve in the present. Foucault expUcitly approaches his studies in the history of philosophy beginning with current question in order encourage people Uve and look at the world in new way while Hadot aims to nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own (Foucault 1996a, 406; Hadot 1995b, 280). For both of these thinkers, the history of philosophy serves as matrix through which they can work transform themselves and others as part of philosophical life. For all their cross-pollination and agreement on the richness and depth of the idea of philosophy as of life, the two disagree on what exactly this of life is and how ancient philosophy could contribute. At conference held in recognition of the fourth anniversary of Foucault's death, Hadot delivered some remarks on Foucault's work in the philosophy of antiquity. These remarks are especially worth close consideration for two reasons. First, both thinkers are notoriously reticent discuss what their goals are for the transformation of their lives and the lives of those around them. Hadot's remarks offer privileged window into the two philosophers' different present-day concerns, discussion that is ongoing in the scholarship on Foucault but has hardly begun in regard Hadot. …