The Italian Constitutional Court under stress. How to respond to political inefficiency

Abstract

ABSTRACT Constitutional courts in several European democracies are under stress. In Italy, the inefficiency of the system of government has led to increasing calls for the Court to intervene in crucial legislative matters. This article examines how and why the Constitutional Court plays a key role in contemporary Italian politics. First, it focuses on the determining factors of the political system that have strengthened the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis other political branches. Second, through a quali-quantitative analysis, it focuses on controversial decision-making techniques that have enabled constitutional judges to participate in the law-making process. It focuses on the so-called ‘warnings to the legislature’, which correspond to formal invitations to parliament to intervene in a particular discipline. It then examines the ‘manipulative judgments’ that have pushed the boundaries of constitutional adjudication, with the Court increasingly assuming the role of ‘positive legislator’. Third, the article examines the consequences of the Court’s expanding role in specific policy areas, shedding light on recent judicial decisions relating to assisted suicide. The aim of the article is to contribute to the understanding of the changing role of Constitutional courts in democratic political regimes at a time of their more or less manifest crisis.