Abstract
The article analyses the Italian Government’s response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic and, more precisely, the centralization of decisions and the consequent marginalization of Parliament and Regions. The author assesses the compatibility of the governmental emergency measures with the Italian Constitution (which does not expressly regulate the “state of emergency”) and with the principle of proportionality, in order to verify whether the compression of some fundamental rights and constitutional competencies was justified by the contingent crisis.
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