The issues involved in the reform of the Bulgarian judicial system

Abstract

The reform of the judicial systems of the post-Communist European countries has been and still is one of the essential criteria for admission to the European Union. These reforms have proved to be more long-drawn-out and more difficult than could be expected and the case of Bulgaria, in 2005, is no exception to this. This article presents, on the one hand, the legislative and constitutional aspects of the reform of the Bulgarian judicial system and, on the other, the historic and political context. It shows that the introduction of the democratic principle of the separation and independence of the judiciary can have certain negative consequences for the workings of the judicial system, now subject to the control of a body emanating from it, the Higher Judicial Council, which is too corporatist to exercise that effective self-regulation which would make it possible to eliminate the endemic politicization and corruption of the magistrates. It also shows the distinction that must be made and must be accepted between the independence of the judiciary in the exercising of its judicial functions and the necessity of introducing hierarchical regulation, by administrative means, of the effective functioning of the judicial system and the management of its resources.