The issue of informed consent and the use of neuroleptic medications

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Stepping aside from philosophical questions concerning reality qua reality there is a basic assumption of an actual ‘out there’, an objective state of reference, against which an individual may posit faulty thinking which has taken the form of delusions, hallucinations, and other misperceptions occurring in the subjective experience of the individual. It is in the sphere of thought and action that psychosis is determined; and, for the purpose of this paper, the matter of competency or incompetency is established in mental illness. An individual is considered competent to consent as a presupposition of informl (b) to protect allegedly irresponsible persons from themselves; (c) to protect society from anticipated dangerous acts by these persons; and (d) to relieve society-and/or the family-of the trouble of accommodating individuals who, though not dangerous, are bothersome. For many (Kolb, 1973), the British Mental Health Act of 1959 represents the most advanced trend in the treatment of individuals with profound behavior disturbances. One who is psychiatrically ill receives treatment under the same circumstances as a patient with a medical or surgical diagnosis. When involuntary commitment is required, the matter is recognized as a medical decision and not a civil or judicial situation. In the United States each state has its own laws pertaining to involuntary commitment. This diversity led the National Advisory Mental Health Council in 1949 to request the