Abstract
B ought to refrain from φing. Taking a 10% chance is taking a substantial chance of doing a deeply morally wrong thing. One should be very averse to risking doing a deeply wrong thing. It is better to do what is very likely a minorly wrong thing to do than to risk doing what is a deeply wrong thing to do. Suppose that B does φ, φing is in fact morally wrong, and a victim of B’s φing were to later try to hold B responsible for φing. Could B defend himor herself by saying “but I believed that φing was morally required”? No! B knew that B was risking doing a deeply morally wrong thing, only for the sake of what B believed was a minor moral requirement. For this reason, B is blameworthy for φing, and it is appropriate to hold B responsible for φing.
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