The Irreducibility of Vision: Gestalt, Crowding and the Fundamentals of Vision.

Abstract

What is fundamental in vision has been discussed for millennia. For philosophical realists and the physiological approach to vision, the objects of the outer world are truly given, and failures to perceive objects properly, such as in illusions, are just sporadic misperceptions. The goal is to replace the subjectivity of the mind by careful physiological analyses. Continental philosophy and the Gestaltists are rather skeptical or ignorant about external objects. The percepts themselves are their starting point, because it is hard to deny the truth of one own′s percepts. I will show that, whereas both approaches can well explain many visual phenomena with classic visual stimuli, they both have trouble when stimuli become slightly more complex. I suggest that these failures have a deeper conceptual reason, namely that their foundations (objects, percepts) do not hold true. I propose that only physical states exist in a mind independent manner and that everyday objects, such as bottles and trees, are perceived in a mind-dependent way. The fundamental processing units to process objects are extended windows of unconscious processing, followed by short, discrete conscious percepts.