Abstract

Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by sui generis feelings towards value.

Highlights

  • Reductivism in Emotion TheoryMuch philosophical study of emotions attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to either one, or a combination of, more familiar states

  • Note the originality of this approach: in contrast to aforementioned reductions of emotions to familiar mental states, some of which arguably have no phenomenal characters, we reduce emotional phenomenology to other phenomenologies

  • As is clear from discussion above, in claiming emotional phenomenology is sui generis one needs to provide an account of that phenomenology, and show it irreducible to the phenomenal characters of the state(s) the reductivist suggests

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Much philosophical study of emotions attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to either one, or a combination of, more familiar states. This article argues Kriegel’s reductivism, and similar proposals in the literature, are unsuccessful because typical emotional experiences include sui generis feelings towards value (FTVs for short).[6] Note, I do not claim FTVs exhaust the phenomenology of emotions—their overall phenomenal character may include proprioceptive, algedonic, conative, and cognitive phenomenology. 5 I go beyond Kriegel’s CP, and consider alternative proposals concerning algedonic, conative, and cognitive phenomenology, explaining why FTVs don’t reduce to combinations of these phenomenologies One worry about this approach is the conjunction of two ostensibly separate projects, (1) a critique of Kriegel’s, and similar forms of, reductivism, and (2) a positive characterization of emotional phenomenology as including sui generis FTVs. as is clear from discussion above, in claiming emotional phenomenology is sui generis one needs to provide an account of that phenomenology, and show it irreducible to the phenomenal characters of the state(s) the reductivist suggests. It is with this constraint in mind that (1) and (2) are pursued in tandem

The Evaluative Aspect of Emotions
Framing the Critique of Kriegel
Feelings Towards Value
FTVs Do Not Reduce to Other Phenomenologies or Their Combination
The Evaluativist Account of Pain
Conative‐Algedonic Phenomenology Combined
Evaluative Intuitions and Combining the Cognitive and Conative‐Algedonic
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call