The irreconcilability of insight

Abstract

We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning—and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program.