The Introduction of Federalism in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

Abstract

Among the great variety of fiscal institutions, a current tendency, probably favored by the globalization process, is that to increase the power of minor levels of government. This tendency was particularly emphasized in Europe in consequence of the transfer of powers from national governments to the European Union. A typical case of this decentralization process is that of Italy, a country that since its origin, in 1861, was based on the Napoleonic administrative centralization. In 2001, however, a constitutional reform decided that «The Republic is constituted by municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions and the State” (art. 114). Since that time, Italian regions, and more than 8000 local governments, started acting almost independently from the central government (from which they continued, however, to draw a great part of their financial resources). This situation appears to be proper of a kind of ‘anarchic polycentrism’ rather than fiscal federalism, with a lot of contradictions between decisions taken by the central government and those of the subcentral and local powers. This paper focuses on the bureaucratic and political shortcomings of the devolution of powers in a centralized and unitary state.