The intoxication defense and theories of criminal liability: a praxeological approach

Abstract

This paper applies an emerging method of research, “legal praxeology,” to the study of decisions concerning intoxication as a defense to criminal charges. This method is based on the observation that judges import their own values, attitudes and beliefs into their decisions in identifiable ways. We observed this phenomenon in 40 cases and deduced that judicial views about the intoxication defense are organized around two major constructs that themselves are drawn from the substrate of judicial views concerning the basis of criminal liability in general. The resulting two-dimensional analytic framework was then applied to the leading Canadian case, R. v. Daviault [1994]3 SCR 63. We observe that majority and minority opinions of the Supreme Court in Daviault fall out along the dimensions extracted from the 40 cases, as does the text of the legislative amendment introduced in the wake of the decision (Bill C-72, now S.33.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada). In Daviault, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms plays a significant role in challenging the judges of the Supreme Court to identify their fundamental values and beliefs. We conclude that the Charter is a benign catalyst to the development of legal praxeology in that it calls for a more declarative, and thus public, jurisprudence. Charter-assisted legal praxeology goes some way toward revealing the great social value tensions locked up in what at first appear to be purely legal doctrinal disputes concerning the scope and application of the intoxication defense.