The Intervention of the Israeli High Court of Justice in Government Decisions: An Empirical, Quantitative Perspective

Abstract

The current study continues the empirical, quantitative line of research, which, in recent years, has become an important part of the literature pertaining to the relationship between law and politics in Israel. This literature discusses the relationship between the Supreme Court as the High Court of Justice (HCJ) and the political system of government and the Knesset, but lacks a quantitative analysis of this relationship mainly by the government. This study, based on 2,869 petitions filed by petitioners to the HCJ against the government and its members between 2000 and 2006, seeks to remedy this lack. We found that despite the increase in petitions against the government, the HCJ intervenes less in the government's work—only in 18% of cases did it intervene and hear the petitioners. According to the data, about 50% of the petitions were rejected by the HCJ, 21% were postponed, and 11% were retracted, either by the state or by the petitioner. This study is mainly descriptive and does not pretend to deeply analyze the reasons for the findings. Such analyses may be found in an institutional-process analysis of the relationship between the HCJ and the Israeli government as a means for resolving the empirical findings.