The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change.

Abstract

Two experiments examined the hypothesis that the sequence of affect and cognition in an attitude's formation an important determinant of its subsequent resistance to affective and cognitive means of persuasion. Affect-based and cognition-based attitudes were induced and subsequently challenged by either affective or cognitive means of persuasion. The procedure used to create the 2 types of attitudes and the means of persuasion involved varying the sequence of affect and cognition while holding the content of communications constant. As predicted, affect-based attitudes exhibited more change under affective means of persuasion than under cognitive means of persuasion. Cognition-based attitudes, on the other hand, exhibited equal change under both forms of persuasion. The interaction between attitude type and means of persuasion emerged both when affect was manipulated subliminally (Experiment 1) and when affect was manipulated supraliminally (Experiment 2). Moreover, in the 2nd experiment, affect-based attitudes were expressed with greater confidence than their cognition-based counterparts. Together, these findings underscore the theoretical as well as practical importance of distinguishing between affect- and cognitionbased attitudes and, more generally, the need for influence attempts to make contact with an attitude's origin. Whether in the form of education or propaganda, whether the desired end virtuous or evil, persuasion plays a central role in social behavior. Parents and teachers use persuasion to instill appropriate attitudes in young people and to modify attitudes they consider inappropriate. Members of social groups rely on persuasion to gain representation and recognition. Spiritual, intellectual, business, and social leaders assert their strength and maintain a following in large part through persuasive efforts. And participants in a democracy are keenly aware of the important role persuasion and oratory play in the decision making of legislators. Yet two questions remain equivocal: What constitutes the best method of persuasion? And why do some persuasive attempts fail on one occasion and succeed on another? The Platonic ideal of persuasion emphasizes the exercise of reason and places a premium on skills of oration. This theme underlies a substantial body of empirical work on attitude change, much of which has its origins in the Yale Communication Research Program (Hovland, 1949; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). According to this perspective, acceptance of a persuasive message dependent on the existence of incentives, and a critical incentive is provided by arguments or reasons which. . . constitute 'rational' or 'logical' support for the con