Abstract
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a War Crimes Tribunal to prosecute atrocities that were committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia, after the conflict in the region drew wide public attention. It was envisaged that the tribunal would aid in the restoration of peace and security in the Balkans. Moreover, the court was intended to be an effective instrument for punishing alleged war criminals in order to discourage future violators. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement finally brought a fragile peace to the region, but most indicted war criminals remain at large. This article illustrates the difficulties the tribunal has to face and argues that in the negotiations leading to the Dayton Agreement, peace superseded justice, because the leaders involved in negotiations ‐ Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milošević ‐ can also be said to bear responsibility for failing to prevent war crimes committed by troops under their control, and possibly even ordered ‘ethnic cleansing’.
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