Abstract
IN ANY consideration of the foreign policy of Netherlands India, the first thought which comes to mind is that the Sino-Japanese conflict, a manifestation of Japanese imperialism, threatens both Holland and its colonial empire. At present there is no other question of foreign policy to disturb Holland. Its relations with England, France and the United States are satisfactory, and their respective possessions offer no problem. Nor does the United States, which is considering retirement from the Philippines, plan to extend its influence beyond these islands. There is nothing worthy of note in the relations between Netherlands India and Indochina, save the inauguration in September I938 of a Dutch air service between Batavia and Saigon. Some months earlier the same company instituted a service to Australia as well. Relations with Siam are of minor importance and call for no particular comment: the residency in Batavia of one branch of the former king's family is of no political significance.' Besides the Japanese, the only threat to the Dutch colonies might be a German seizure of these rich lands. It could be realized only as the result of a victory enabling Germany to dictate to the world. This is not a specifically Indonesian problem. Thus it follows that the only Indonesian problem of Dutch foreign policy lies in the consequences which the Sino-Japanese conflict may have for the Indies. A priori one might suppose that, from the Dutch point of view, the problem is of this nature. Japan is a young, formidable and well-armed power which has never concealed its vast ambitions: all of Asia, including Netherlands India, must be enslaved by Japan. Accordingly, a victory by China is desirable, for it will leave this formidable adversary exhausted and long incapable of resuming its imperialist policy of expansion.
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