Abstract

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its judgments are usually considered highly persuasive as to propositions of international law. Thus, when the ICJ formulates a rule of international law giving binding force to a unilateral declaration of a state’s future intentions, statesmen may be expected to refer to that formulation for guidance whenever they consider the possibility of issuing a declaration of future policy. Moreover, the ability of the ICJ to support its formulation of a rule of international law in terms of the international legal order and legal logic affects the perceptions of statesmen as to the probity of the Court, as well as the willingness of states to refer real cases to it. The Judgment of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases raised both these issues in a particularly pointed way.

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