Abstract
Abstract— In our politically fragmented urban areas, sheriff's police services, like all municipal services, are distributed free of any direct charge. This study attempts to determine the optimal quantities of county police activity each political district should receive as well as their matching tax bills. The outcome of the analysis is pronouncedly influenced by the peculiar nature of externalities that occur in the provision of urban law enforcement services. Achievement of optimality conditions indicates an inverse relationship between sheriff's per capita expenditures and per capita tax base values of the participating political units.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
