The Intellectual Bias of Virtue Ethics

Abstract

The difference between virtues and skills has a long history in ethics. This history is confused, frustrating and, I will argue, generally harmful to human flourishing in the West. It engendered a form of elitism which for centuries systematically excluded certain groups of people from being models of human virtue. I will argue in this paper that the central problem is a conflation of the skillvirtue distinction with differences in lifestyles. Originating in the class structure of the Athenian polis, this confusion continues today and is a major drawback of current virtue theory. Aristotle distinguishes techne or craft-knowledge from phronesis (1140a-1140b25).1 Techne is concerned with production. The end is given and the problem is how to produce it. Phronesis or practical wisdom deliberates about ends themselves with human flourishing as the goal. Crafts or skills can be used in a virtuous or vicious way and their use is contingent on the degree of phronesis the agent brings to the act. Thus excellent bricklaying can be done for ends which are destructive to human flourishing (concentration camp) or conducive to it (university building). Excellence in bricklaying is to be very good in a skill; excellence in practical wisdom is human excellence or virtue. Aristotle concludes, 'Clearly, then, phronesis is a virtue, not (a form of) craft knowledge.' (1140b25). This basic distinction is echoed by modern virtue theorists. Wallace puts it this way. Skills concerned with production may or may not be worth having for an individual.2 For example, excellence in debating requires a certain skill; debating can be done more or less well. But it may not be a skill everyone wants or needs. On the other hand, we do not call a trait a virtue unless we think it is worth having as a human being. Wallace argues that the best explanation for this difference is that virtues (such as courage) are human excellences whereas skills (like debating) are not. As Wallace notes, both skills and virtues may require difficult and complex learning. 1 All quotations from Aristotle are taken from Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis, In: Hackett, 1985). 2 J. Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 43-44.