The Integrity of Persons

Abstract

This chapter outlines the philosophy of “personalism” and concentrates on John Macmurray’s exposition of “personalism”. This theorist was chosen because his conception and thesis of persons-in-relation as the leitmotif of a human being is instructive for our consideration of the social policies of inclusion regarding intellectual disability and how they have positively influenced the lives of persons. Social personhood is a constant theme in Macmurray’s philosophy and he presented philosophical form and method “capable of analyzing personality, its modes of experience and its relatedness to both the material and human world” (Conford, The personal world: John Macmurray on self and society. Guildford: Floris Books, 1996, p. 20). Macmurray’s notion of persons-in-relation argues that what counts as being a person is how persons engage through personal relationships with other persons. That is, a person is unintelligible unless his/her interactions and intercourse with other persons is considered. This is similar to what Pfeiffer in 2005 argues: that “people with disabilities (like all people) are humans, fabile, make mistakes and are capable of taking risks (p. 139), however are persons living with an intellectual disability allowed to live this way? The general myths that are often held of persons living with the experience of an intellectual disability appear to indicate that these persons are not permitted to take risks like other persons. In human services practitioners often describe the person they work with in negative terms, for example Saint-Jacques, Turcotte, and Pouliot (Adopting a strengths perspective in social work practice with families in difficulty: From theory to practice. Family & Society, 90, 454–461, 2009) discovered that on 72% of occasions, practitioners used weakness words rather than strength-based words about persons they worked with. This contrasts with contemporary theorists such as Kristeva (At the limits of living: To Joseph Grigely. Journal of Visual Culture, 5, 219–225, 2006, 2010, A tragedy and a dream: Disability revisited. Irish Theological Quarterly, 78(3), 219–230, 2013), Vanier (Becoming human. Toronto, Canada: House of Anansi Press, 1998) and Reinders (The future of the disabled in liberal society: An ethical analysis. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, Receiving the gift of friendship: Profound disability, theological anthropology, and ethics. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2008). These scholars offer a positive ontology of disability, that is, they present persons as competent, engaged with other persons and capable of living flourishing lives. This sets the framework for the following chapter that analyses neoliberalism, culture and belonging. The first section briefly explores the central constituents of personalism as a philosophy. The second presents a reading of Macmurray, which locates his philosophy within the tradition of personalism. The penultimate section presents Kristeva’s (2006, 2010, 2013) theory. Finally, in Sect. 2.4, Macmurray’s thesis, the form of the personal, its nexus with Kristeva (2006, 2010, 2013) and its relevance with social policies of inclusion are discussed.