The integration of cooptation and coercion: China’s Taiwan strategy since 2001

Abstract

In the past half-decade, China has developed a careful balance of cooptative and coercive power in its attempts to dampen the Taiwan independence movement and pursue political unification. In essence, attempts to curry favor with politically relevant constituencies on Taiwan have been paired with attempts to diplomatically isolate and militarily threaten the island's top policymakers. This balance is risky because of the possibility that it may appear too lenient to PRC nationalists, and too provocative to ROC residents. Nevertheless, the current structure of carrots and sticks has emerged for three reasons. First, the institutional coherence of Chinese decision-making and implementation has allowed for the viability of an adaptive, long-term approach. Second, the constraints on both unreinforced cooptation and coercive diplomacy have mediated toward a posture in which the former is enhanced and the latter downplayed. Third, expanded external opportunities in recent years have made it possible to exploit this middle ground.