The Institutionalisation of the Responsibility to Protect

Abstract

INTRODUCTION In recent years the international community has witnessed a process of paramount importance to the future consolidation (and ultimate relevance) of the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), that is, a process of institutionalisation. The latter term is presently understood as the process of creating legal structures or bodies that correspond to a social reality. The analysis of this process may lead one to wonder whether R2P has led to the establishment of institutions and bodies that facilitate its implementation. This chapter considers whether R2P can be assessed as a concept that has a ‘transformative’ power within international institutions. More specifically, the chapter will provide a synthetic overview of the institutionalisation of the R2P. When addressing this issue, one should distinguish between the institutionalisation of the R2P that is taking place within the United Nations (UN) and that which is taking place outside of the organisation because there are different institutional dynamics within different areas of international law and society. Within the UN, R2P has led to the creation of new bodies such as the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. This process has generated some difficulties for the UN Secretary-General as revealed by proceedings of the UNGA's Fift h Committee. The concept of R2P is closely connected to the debate on UN institutional reform, including Security Council reform, evolution of UN peacekeeping missions and the establishment of a Peace Building Commission. In this context, the reform of the Security Council is particularly important becouse it plays clearly a key role in the implementation of the R2P. The veto of the P5 can be regarded as an obstacle to that implementation. One may consider that the institutionalisation of the R2P will remain incomplete as long as the Security Council sees no reform. This chapter will then focus on the so-called ‘reasonable use of the veto power’ or the implementation of a ‘code of conduct for the P5’. In this regard, it will demonstrate that such proposals can be considered as a consolidation of the ‘political responsibility’ of the P5, rather than a genuine legal reform.