Abstract
The Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions are the clearest example of the states’ improving legal fortunes in litigation against the federal government. Reducing the dramatic shift in the Court's federalism jurisprudence to the attitudinal voting of individual justices ignores the influence on the Court's decision making from broader institutional developments in American politics and domestic policy. These developments include: (1) the diminishing effectiveness of the states’ lobbying power in the federal policymaking arena; (2) the increasing effectiveness of litigation by states’ attorneys general in the federal judicial arena; and (3) the convergence of these developments resulting in a pro‐state Supreme Court agenda.
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