The Institutional Preconditions of Epistemic Justice

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper proposes four comprehensive institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice. Driven by the distinction between transactional and structural injustice, we argue that approaches which call for individual virtue overlook the social inequalities that reproduce unjust epistemic relationships. The task of remedying epistemic injustice, therefore, falls upon institutions. First, we review recent empirical research to show why the virtue theoretical model fails to address even transactional instances of epistemic injustice. We then argue that, due to unequal access to education, seemingly justified ascriptions of trust can entrench differential epistemic development. We have limited our proposal to four measures that shield vulnerable groups against injustice and improve the epistemic environment. Institutional epistemic justice demands that, first, all groups enjoy fair and equal access to education and the opportunity to acquire the socially recognized markers of credibility. Second, epistemic justice requires that marginalized groups have access to the relevant public platforms, such as politics and journalism, for voicing their social perspectives. Third, fair access to public positions can aid vulnerable groups in attaining rewarding careers, publicly affirming their epistemic resources, and rupturing the cycle of epistemic disadvantage. As our fourth and final measure, we propose institutional mechanisms for eliminating identity markers from formal epistemic exchanges.