Abstract
The analysis adopts a basic, rationalist framework for interaction. African governments face some tough choices when deciding whether or not they want to engage with the EU in governance reforms. Building on a research on EU good governance support and authoritarian regimes, the chapter argues that African governments’ decisions are affected by four factors: first, the EU’s good governance strategies (the content or substance of what the EU seeks to promote as part of its good governance agenda and the instruments the EU uses); second, African governments’ survival strategies; third, African countries’ economic dependence on the EU (e.g. in terms of aid and trade); and fourth, access to cooperation with China. The empirical case studies assess the relative explanatory power and interaction effects of these four factors.
Highlights
The basic interest for both—the EU and African governments—is to remain in power, and their decisions to cooperate on governance reforms are informed by this basic interest
They analyse their interest in the bilateral relationship and weigh the benefits and costs of cooperating on governance reforms against those of engaging in other areas and policy fields within the context of their bilateral relations. They weigh the costs and benefits of their bilateral cooperation against opportunities for cooperation offered by third actors, such as China. In this regard, cooperating on governance reforms can be described as a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam 1988), where the EU’s and African governments’ preferences for cooperation and their bargaining power are substantially shaped by the domestic costs and benefits that cooperation entails
The instruments and the institutional framework for cooperation are substantially shaped by the EU: the EU makes an offer for THE INITIAL PUZZLE: WHY GOVERNMENTS IN DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS... 23 cooperation; it asks African governments to engage in political dialogue, aid policy dialogues, the implementation of governance aid or to comply with EU demands for political reforms
Summary
The Initial Puzzle: Why Governments in Dominant Party Systems Engage with the EU on Good Governance Reform, or Not. The EU and African governments do not make their decisions about when, how and on what aspects of governance reforms they want to cooperate in isolation. Their decisions are deeply embedded in negotiations about development aid and interests in the wider network of bilateral economic, security and political cooperation. Whereas the EU’s motives for and interests in promoting governance reforms are comparatively well researched, much less is known about the factors that shape African governments’ willingness to engage with the EU. This is the central concern of this book. Actors are assumed to make decisions about cooperation consciously and to base
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