The Information Research Department, Unattributable Propaganda, and Northern Ireland, 1971–1973: Promising Salvation but Ending in Failure?

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in Northern Ireland during the first half of the 1970s. After discussing British conceptualisations of propaganda, it offers a detailed account of IRD activity, including how a Foreign Office department came to be involved in operations on British soil; how IRD propaganda fitted into the broader British state apparatus in Northern Ireland; the activity in which the IRD was engaged—both in Northern Ireland and beyond; and some of the challenges it faced, which ultimately limited the campaign’s effectiveness. It argues that the IRD’s role was driven by decisions taken at the very top of government and took shape against a context of financial cuts, a deteriorating security situation in Northern Ireland, and a tradition of domestic propaganda in the UK. The IRD sought to advance four key themes: exploiting divisions within the IRA; undermining the IRA’s credibility amongst the population; linking the IRA to international terrorism; and portraying the IRA as communist.