The Influence of Unions on CSR: Is There a Trade‐Off Between Employee‐Oriented and Non–Employee‐Oriented Policies?

Abstract

AbstractStrategic managers are consistently faced with decisions of how to allocate a company's scarce resources to meet the demands of shareholders and other powerful and legitimate stakeholders. This article analyses whether higher union density at company level pushes management to engage more in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Drawing from stakeholder theory and the resource allocation approach of CSR as well as union voice and monopoly models, this article finds that companies have to substitute non–employee‐oriented CSR with employee‐oriented CSR as union density increases but is still at low levels. At higher levels of union density, companies can complement both types of CSR. This perhaps represents a reinforcement of mutual interests between management and organized labour, which has implications for managerial prerogatives as well as union positioning in the labour and political process.