Abstract
The authors, relying on previously unexplored and little-studied materials, analyze the reasons for the refusal of the top leadership of Japan from armed aggression against the USSR and the turn of the expansion of militaristic Japan into the zone of the South Seas. The authors conclude that the famous decision to abandon the attack on Soviet territories was dictated by the entire course of the Sino-Japanese war, which took a lot of resources from Japan and, moreover, required the seizure of possessions in Southeast Asia. It was precisely because of the occupation of Southern Indochina that relations between Japan and the United States became sharply complicated in the second half of the summer of 1941, which led to an embargo by the Allies against Japan and the latter’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
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