THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROTATION OF THE GOVERNOR’S CORPS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS IN MODERN RUSSIA

Abstract

Introduction. The change of power and the renewal of political leadership are traditionally regarded as an integral feature of democratic states. For Russia, which has recently embarked on the path of democratization, ensuring the rotation of persons holding public positions is seen as one of the most difficult problems. The federal nature of the state structure requires the formation of effective mechanisms for the turnover of power not only at the national, but also at the regional level. Materials and methods. In preparing the article, the personnel policy of the federal center in relation to the governor’s corps was analyzed. Among the main research methods used are the content analysis method, the decision-making method, the situational method, the institutional method, and the activity method. Results. In modern Russia, the control of the federal center over the transit of power in the regions is due to the inclusion of governors into a single vertical of executive power. The goals of the rotation of the leadership are to prevent the defeat of candidates supported by the authorities with a low electoral rating, to solve regional problems under the guidance of competent crisis managers, and to ensure subordinate relations between the center and the periphery. The instruments that guarantee the change of power are the appointment by the President of the Russian Federation of an official acting temporarily instead of the current governor, and his subsequent election with the support of the federal center and political organizations affiliated with the state. It is substantiated that the current practice negatively affects the federal principles of the state and regional institutions of democracy, the participation of the population in managing the affairs of the state, provokes a conflict between the old and new regional elites. Conclusions. According to the results of the study, the redundancy of the influence of the central state apparatus on the process of forming the executive power of the subfederal level is proved, recommendations are formulated to overcome this problem.