Abstract
We investigated the effects of stock right separation in China on accounting conservatism. We find that the percentage of non-tradable share have significantly negative effect on accounting conservatism because non-tradable shareholders do not care about change of stock market price. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher largest shareholder ownership have lower accounting conservatism. Controlling shareholders may expropriate benefits from them or exploit private benefits; therefore they have less incentive to disclose information. Finally, we also find that the percentage of non-controlling shareholders ownership has significantly positive effect on accounting conservatism. When they hold stake shares, non-controlling shareholders have incentive and ability to monitor managers and controlling shareholders in order to mitigate the asymmetry information. These results are consistent with demand from non-controlling block shareholders are greater than that from controlling shareholder.
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