Abstract
This paper offers a fresh perspective on executive compensation by offering a new paradigm for choosing executive compensation structure based on environmental factors and firm size. This new perspective uses agency theory as a theoretical foundation. The availability of information, primarily information related to the agent, has typically been of utmost concern in the compensation selection process. However, a predominant focus on cognitive or behavioral information of the agent neglects the relative importance and impact of environmental forces in this process. This study evaluates the composition of the compensation contract using fluctuating environmental dimensions as the primary determinant. Specifically, we examine environmental munificence, dynamism, and complexity and the influence of varying levels of each of these variables and their interaction on the optimal choice of compensation contract utilized for both large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This externally focused view of compensation contract creation underscores the significance of environmental factors in determining contract selection while also acknowledging the necessity of principals utilizing information related to both the agent and the environment. Furthermore, we argue that top executive compensation structures for large organizations and non-adaptive SMEs should differ from those of adaptive SMEs.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
