The influence of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the governance level of state-owned enterprises--Based on the perspective of board resolution behavior and party organization governance.

Abstract

With an increasing number of heterogeneous shareholders participating in corporate governance in reality, the assumption of shareholder homogeneity in agency theory is gradually relaxing in the modern field of corporate governance. The policy of mixed ownership reform in China provides empirical evidence for studying heterogeneous shareholder governance. To fully understand the governance effects of non-state shareholders, we employ the ownership proportion held by non-state shareholders among the top ten shareholders and the appointment of directors as measures for non-state shareholder governance. Using a panel fixed-effect model from the perspective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) party organizations, we examine the impact of non-state shareholder governance on the governance level of SOEs. The study reveals that non-state shareholder governance positively affects the governance level of SOEs, with board resolutions playing a crucial role in this relationship. When party members serve as directors, the governance effect of non-state shareholders is more significant. Based on the aforementioned research findings, we recommend further refining corporate governance measures for SOEs within the context of SOE reforms. It is advisable to optimize the party organizational governance structure and leverage the synergistic effects of non-state shareholder governance and party organizational governance. Advancing reforms along the Pareto improvement path will contribute to establishing a distinctive corporate governance system for Chinese SOEs.