Abstract
The purpose of this study is to explore how the executive team continuation affects the successor's investment decisions. To this end, we use data of Chinese A‐share listed heritage family enterprises. The findings reveal that executive team continuation has a negative impact on inefficient investment. At the same time, the successor's control rights have a moderating effect on the relationship between the executive team continuation and the successor's investment decisions. In addition, further research shows that the heterogeneity of senior executives' tenure, the number of independent directors, and the distribution of senior executives' professional backgrounds are conducive to explaining the internal mechanism of the continuation of the management team.
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