Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of internal control on executive pay-performance sensitivity in public welfare SOE and commercial SOE in China by empirical study. Finally, we find that the implementation of internal control can not improve executive pay-performance sensitivity in all kinds of SOE, which means the reform of state-owned enterprises in China can not be the same mode. We need to explore different methods to improve internal control quality in different types of SOE.

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