Abstract
Interest groups’ influence on government affects economic policy making and has an impact on economic crises. Under Argentina’s convertibility exchange-rate regime until its collapse in 2001, tradable-goods entrepreneurs’ preferences depended on the degree to which the government offered them trade-offs either to offset the loss of competitiveness stemming from the currency peg or to exempt them from the costs of devaluation. For the nontradable sector and investors the costs of maintaining the peg to the dollar were always less than those entailed in abandoning the regime. While the fiscal and external inconsistencies of convertibility reduced the preference of the International Monetary Fund for maintaining convertibility, the cost of changing it induced the Fund to continue financing the Argentine government. Moreover, the influence exerted on the IMF by the governments of countries whose businesses had been affected by the distribution of the cost of abandoning the convertibility discouraged financial collaboration by the foreign assistance organizations during the collapse. La influencia de los grupos de interés sobre el gobierno afecta la orientación de la política económica y tiene su impacto en las crisis económicas. Durante el régimen de convertibilidad en Argentina hasta su colapso en 2001, las preferencias de los empresarios de bienes transables dependían del grado en que el gobierno les ofrecía compensaciones, sea para moderar la pérdida de competitividad derivada de la fijación o para sustraerlos de los costos de la devaluación. Para los empresarios del sector no transable y los inversores financieros los costos de mantener la fijación con el dólar resultaron siempre inferiores que los de salir del régimen. Si las inconsistencias fiscales y externas de la convertibilidad desalentaban la preferencia del FMI por mantener la convertibilidad, los costos de cambiarla indujeron al Fondo a sostener el financiamiento al gobierno argentino. Asimismo, la influencia que ejercieron sobre el FMI los gobiernos de los países cuyas empresas habían sido afectadas en la distribución de los costos del cambio de régimen cambiario desalentó la colaboración financiera de los organismos proveedores de ayuda externa durante el colapso.
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