Abstract
Determinist beliefs have been shown to impact basic motor preparation, prosocial behavior, performance monitoring, and voluntary inhibition, presumably by diminishing the recruitment of cognitive resources for self-regulation. We sought to support and extend previous findings by applying a belief manipulation to a novel inhibition paradigm that requires participants to either execute or suppress a prepotent withdrawal reaction from a strong aversive stimulus (thermal pain). Action and inhibition responses could be determined by either external signals or voluntary choices. Our results suggest that the reduction of free will beliefs corresponds with a reduction in effort investment that influences voluntary action selection and inhibition, most directly indicated by increased time required to initiate a withdrawal response internally (but not externally). It is likely that disbelief in free will encourages participants to be more passive, to exhibit a reduction in intentional engagement, and to be disinclined to adapt their behavior to contextual needs.
Highlights
The question of whether free will truly exists is an age-old philosophical question, tackled by thinkers ranging from Democritus to Russell
MANIPULATION CHECK To test the effectiveness of the belief manipulation, a mixed design ANOVA was conducted on participants’ total FAD-scores before and after the experiment using Time (Pre-test vs. Post-test) as a within-subject factor and Belief condition (Anti-free will vs. Control) as a between-subjects factor
(Choice vs. Directed) as a within-subjects factor and Belief condition (Anti-free will vs. Control) as a between-subjects factor, revealed a main effect of Instruction, F(1, 23) = 79.310, p < 0.01, such that participants were slower to respond on choice trials (Choice: M = 807 ms, SD = 158 ms; Directed: M = 567 ms, SD = 108 ms), consistent with piloting and reflecting the time needed for a response decision
Summary
The question of whether free will truly exists is an age-old philosophical question, tackled by thinkers ranging from Democritus to Russell. An increase in mindless conformity and a decrease in counterfactual thinking, assumed to be adaptive for learning and social adaptation, have been reported to accompany deterministic beliefs (Baumeister et al, 2011; Alquist et al, 2013). When these studies included a condition promoting free will, results were consistent with the control group, suggesting that a belief in free will is a common default state
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