Abstract

This paper uses data from all the listed high-tech enterprises in China, from 2013 to 2018, as the samples employed to study the impact of government subsidies on the innovation of high-tech enterprises, as well as the subsidy mechanism. The mechanism is analysed mainly from the perspectives of resource effect and signal transmission effect. In the theoretical analysis, from the perspective of resource effect, the capital guiding role of government subsidies is considered. In addition, this study creatively discusses the impact of rent-seeking behaviour in combination with China's anti-corruption practice. From the perspective of signal transmission, government subsidies are no longer only interpreted as positive signals of the government being in favour of enterprise financing. This study further believes that government subsidies transmit a signal to the public, encouraging them to strengthen their supervision of subsidised enterprises. A multiple regression model and mediating effect model indicate that government subsidies achieve the purpose of stimulating enterprise innovation. The stimulating effect of government subsidies through financing constraints and signal transmission is 9.48% and 10.16%, respectively. These results are consistent with the positive externality theory and the signal transmission theory. At the end of the paper, several relevant suggestions are presented, according to the current developments.

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