Abstract
The paper aims at showing the influence and the views espoused by economic theories and schools of economics on competition policy embedded in antitrust law and conducted by competition authorities in the field of vertical agreements. The scope of the paper demonstrates how substantially the economization of antitrust law has changed the assessment as to the harmfulness of vertical agreements. The analysis of economic aspects of vertical agreements in antitrust analysis allows one to reveal their pro-competitive effects and benefits, with the consumer being their beneficiary. The basic instrument of the said economization is that antitrust bodies draw on specific economic models and theories that can be employed in their practice. Within the scope of the paper, the author synthesizes the role and influence of those models and schools of economics on the application of competition law in the context of vertical agreements. In presenting, one after another, the theories and schools of economics which used to, or are still dealing with competition policy the author emphasises that in its nature this impact was more or less direct. Some of them remain at the level of general principals and axiology of competition policy, while others, in contrast, delineate concrete evaluation criteria and show how the application of those criteria changes the picture of anti-competitive practices; in other words, why vertical agreements, which in the past used to be considered to restrain competition, are no longer perceived as such. The paper presents the models and recommendations of neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian and neoAustrian school as well as the transaction cost theory.
Highlights
The competition policy addressing vertical agreements represents a continuous challenge in terms of the extent to which antitrust authorities may carry out administrative intervention into this type of agreements
The aim of this paper is to show the role and the extent of the influence exerted by neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian economics as well as the transaction cost theory, on the application of competition law with regard to vertical agreements
At least up to 2022 the economization of competition law in the EU will continue to diverge from the standard for assessing vertical restraints, which is based on consumer welfare, as recommended by the Chicago School
Summary
The competition policy addressing vertical agreements represents a continuous challenge in terms of the extent to which antitrust authorities may carry out administrative intervention into this type of agreements. The scope and effects of the economization of competition law Vertical agreements seen as a hybrid way of organizing business activity encompass a broad range of products and services and types of vertical cooperation They are the preferable and dominant form in which contemporary business functions. The economization process of competition law unfolding on both sides of the Atlantic for 30 years has had the effect that today only very few cases involving vertical agreements are a major concern to be tackled by antitrust authorities These are in the first place arrangements referring to the application of minimum and sticky RPM, location clauses restricting sales markets for distributors, clauses prohibiting or restricting online sales and most-favored clauses These are in the first place arrangements referring to the application of minimum and sticky RPM, location clauses restricting sales markets for distributors, clauses prohibiting or restricting online sales and most-favored clauses (Jurczyk, 2016, pp. 244–353)
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