The Influence of Corporate Governance Structure towards Underpricing

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the influence of corporate governance structure on underpricing when firms perform an Initial Public Offering (IPO). This study is based on the signaling theory, stating that the existence of proper corporate governance structure at the time the firm conducting IPO will give the firm a high quality signal to potential investors. The corporate governance structure tested includes the size of Board of Commissioners (BOC), the level of independence of the Board of Commissioners, and the existence of an audit committee. The hypothesis testing is done using a multiple regression model with a sample of 95 observations from firms doing IPOs listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 2005-2012. The results of this study provide empirical evidence that: (1) the size of Board of Commissioners is negatively correlated and affects underpricing, (2) the level of independence of the Board of Commissioners has no effect on underpricing, (3) the existence of an audit committee has no effect on underpricing, (4 ) corporate governance structure (the BOC size, the independence of the Board of Commissioners, and the existence of audit committees) simultaneously has a positive and significant correlation to underpricing.