Abstract

Since 1999 independence referendum, Timor-Leste (East Timor) has struggled to achieve justice for human rights atrocities committed throughout Indonesia's 25-year de facto administration from 1975 to 1999. In particular, efforts have focused on violations committed prior to and following referendum of 1999, including during three-week scorched earth campaign that was actively encouraged by Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). During this time, it was estimated that 2,000 people were murdered, 60-80 per cent of physical infrastructure across East Timorese territory was destroyed and 400,000 people were displaced. (1) Timor-Leste provides a unique case study on international dimensions of pursuing post-conflict transitional justice as many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations have escaped prosecution with assistance of Indonesian state. This presents challenges for Timor-Leste as it balances competing international and domestic imperatives. On one hand, since attaining sovereignty in 2002 Timor-Leste has been responsible for establishing legitimate democratic institutions that possess widespread public support and encourage socio-political order through respect for rule of law. On other hand, Timor-Leste's national security interests and development capacities depend upon a strong bilateral relationship with Indonesia. This article examines establishment of world's first bilateral reconciliation commission, Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) in 2005. The Commission, comprising half Indonesian and half Timor-Leste Commissioners, was established independently of United Nations (UN). The CTF was responsible for finding conclusive truth about the perpetration of gross human rights violations and institutional by conducting an inquiry and arriving at recommendations and lessons learned. (2) The Commission employed a definition of crimes against humanity that accorded with international law under Rome Statute, including torture, rape and murder. (3) In addressing past crimes, Commission made recommendations regarding institutional reform, development of joint policies, creation of new human rights institutions and provision of material and symbolic reparations. This article argues that since release of CTF report in 2008, both Indonesia and Timor-Leste have demonstrated a lack of political will in implementing many of Commission's recommendations. This suggests that core aim of CTF was to promote cooperation between Timor-Leste and Indonesia through a unique form of international reconciliation designed to set aside past conflict. (4) Timor-Leste's prioritization of reconciliation with Indonesia was evident in ways it permitted Indonesia's avoidance of responsibility for human rights violations committed by senior military and civilian figures in 1999. Following independence referendum in 1999, Timor-Leste faced a number of divergent challenges in implementing post-conflict, transitional justice mechanisms to promote democratization and a human rights culture. (5) The first challenge involved achieving substantive justice, including punishing major human rights crimes committed in past. This was necessary for instituting rule of law, which requires an understanding among citizens that no one is above law. Punishment allows states to deter crime and instil trust in new judicial structures. Democratization and internal sovereignty is supported by establishment of a socio-political order based on widespread public acceptance that state-based laws and judicial institutions are valid and effective. Timor-Leste's second objective was fulfilling international legal commitments. International justice is characterized by global articulation of basic human rights and peremptory norms outlawing crimes against humanity. …

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