The Indirect Perception of Distance: Interpretive Complexities in Berkeley's Theory of Vision

Abstract

he problem of whether perception is direct or if it depends on additional, cognitive contributions made by the perceiving subject, is posed with particular force in an Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (NTV). It is evident from the recurrent treatment it receives therein that Berkeley considers it to be one of the central issues concerning perception. Fittingly, the NTV devotes the most attention to it. In this essay, I deal exclusively with Berkeley’s treatment of the problem of indirect distance perception, as it is presented in the context of that work. This task will consist of three parts. In Section One, I provide an outline of Berkeley’s answer to the question, “What are we immediately aware of in perceptual experience?” Here, I will pay particular attention to Berkeley’s use of the term “association” in describing the indirect or mediate procedure whereby vision acquires information about the spatial layout of the external world. Accordingly, it will be shown that while the visual perception of space is a derivative process, “seeing” distance is by no means a matter of performing geometrical inferences (as Descartes contends). Rather, through an ongoing encounter with stimuli in the environment, perceivers develop the habit of associating one order of sensory information with another. Since Berkeley thought that visual experience lacked inherent three-dimensionality, and that “distance” was registered only by the sense of touch, he hypothesized that retinal information acted as a cue for tangible consequences in the environment. The result is what Robert Schwartz calls “the pragmatic significance of vision,” which is “essentially a guide to movement and touch.”2 For Berkeley, distance