Abstract
This paper investigates the issue of price level indeterminacy under a pure interest rate peg in models that depart from standard Ricardian assumptions. Using a monetary version of Blanchard's finite horizons model, I find wealth effects operating on government bonds are not sufficient to determine a unique price level. Next, I consider price determination under a non-Ricardian fiscal authority. I show that, if agents rationally perceive the possibility of fiscal default, the price level is again indeterminate. I conclude that departures from Ricardian equivalence are not sufficient to ensure a unique price level under a monetary policy of pure interest rate pegging.
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