Abstract
Several philosophers of science have argued that epistemically rational individuals might form epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, rational groups might be composed of irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they entail that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent. We defend the inconsistency thesis by characterizing four criteria for epistemic rationality and then proving that, under said criteria, individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We then explain the implications of our results for descriptive history of science and normative epistemology.
Highlights
Philosophers and social scientists have often argued that rational individuals can form irrational groups and that, CONOR MAYO-WILSON ET AL
In the context of science, the Independence Thesis is the assertion that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists are logically independent,2 and in recent years, this thesis has been defended in various forms
Say a set of methods M is group universally convergent (GUC) if for all networks such that every method in M is employed at least once and everyone employing methods in M is connected via “informational paths” consisting only of scientists employing methods from M, each researcher employing some method in M chooses optimal actions with probability approaching one as inquiry progresses
Summary
Philosophers and social scientists have often argued (both implicitly and explicitly) that rational individuals can form irrational groups and that, CONOR MAYO-WILSON ET AL. Philosophers who employ Bayesian models to draw prescriptions for working scientists often implicitly assume the falsehood of the Independence Thesis: they uncritically conclude that each member of a scientific community ought to adopt Bayesian methodology from the assumption that Bayesianism is rational for an isolated individual.3 Similar remarks can be made for formal learning theory, belief revision, ranking theory, and a host of other inductive methods recommended by philosophers of science and epistemologists.
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